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 
Abstract—Spectrum sharing is a new reality for spectrum 
users.  Implementing sharing regimes on a non-opportunistic 
basis means that sharing agreements must be implemented.  To 
have meaning, those agreements must be enforceable.  We make 
this discussion more concrete by reasoning about enforcement in 
a particular spectrum band (1695-1710 MHz) that is currently 
being proposed for sharing between commercial services (LTE) 
and an incumbent spectrum user in the US.  We examine three 
enforcement approaches, exclusion zones, protection zones and 
pure ex post and consider their implications in terms of cost 
elements, opportunity cost, and their adaptability. 
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PECTRUM sharing has moved from being a radical notion 
to a principle policy focus in the past decade.  This 
becomes evident as one compares the FCC’s Spectrum Policy 
Task Force (SPTF) report from 2002 [1]  with the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) 
Spectrum report [2].  The former report considers spectrum 
sharing as a possible option while the latter makes spectrum 
sharing a key strategy for spectrum access. 
With the significant exception of license free wireless 
systems, commercial wireless services are based on exclusive 
use. As a consequence of the growth of wireless broadband 
demand and services of all types, there is an urgent need for 
on-going spectrum policy reform to make spectrum sharing a 
reality. In spectrum sharing, a spectrum entrant or secondary 
user is granted usage rights contingent upon the licensee’s (or 
primary user’s requirements or usage). With this policy 
change, it becomes necessary to consider how sharing might 
take place in practice.  Generally speaking, spectrum can be 
shared in frequency, time and geographical dimension or any 
combination of those dimensions.  Beyond the technical 
aspects of sharing that must be resolved lie questions about 
how usage rights are appropriately determined and enforced.  
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Weiss et.al [3] summarized the law and economics framework 
of enforcement and applied it in general terms to dynamic 
access networks.  However, this generic application does little 
to assist policymakers on specific problems.   
To that end, this paper considers spectrum sharing in the 
1695-1710 MHz band from the perspective of enforcement.  
This is a band that is on the US National Telecommunications 
and Information Agency (NTIA) “Fast Track” for reallocation 
from government to commercial.  This band is currently being 
used by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) for Meteorological Satellites (MetSat) for satellite 
downlinks.  Since earth stations are stationary, it provides a 
good starting point for working out sharing, especially from an 
enforcement perspective. 
II. CASE DESCRIPTION 
One of the broad visions of the President Obama’s 
Spectrum Initiative [4] is that the Federal government must 
ensure sound government performance and effective use of its 
spectrum, pushing for effective repurposing, sharing, and 
innovative uses of spectrum wherever possible. 
The NTIA issued reports [5] [6] to evaluate different 
Federal and non-Federal spectrum bands for the near-term 
viability of accommodating wireless broadband systems.  
NTIA recommends that 1695-1710 MHz spectrum band could 
be made available within five years, if the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellite-R satellite is redesigned 
and other costs NOAA and other Federal agencies will incur 
in connection with sharing this spectrum band. 
A. Primary User  
NOAA’s MetSat system is the Primary User (PU) and 
consists of geostationary and polar satellites that relay their 
information to earth stations throughout the US.  There are 18 
earth station locations that are critical to NOAA operations 
that are to be protected in the NTIA spectrum sharing 
framework.  The other earth stations are operated by other 
groups, and they will not be protected in the NTIA spectrum 
sharing framework. The use of satellites in a polar orbit means 
that the earth station antenna must track the satellite as it 
crosses the sky.  Thus, at some points in time, the large dish 
antenna of the earth station would have a very low elevation 
(i.e., it would be nearly horizontal). In this position, the 
antenna’s highest gain main lobe would be most vulnerable to 
co-channel interference from a secondary user.   
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B. Secondary User 
The Secondary User (SU) is presumed to be an LTE handset 
system operator.  The shared band would be used for uplinks 
from the handsets to the base stations and would be paired 
with the 2180-2200 MHz band for the downlink [7].  These 
uplinks operate at lower power than base stations, so are less 
likely to cause interference with the PU.  This band is 
attractive to network operators because it is directly adjacent 
to the AWS-1 uplink band 
III. THE GENERAL ASPECTS OF ENFORCEMENT 
In [3], the authors describe enforcement in DSA systems in 
some detail.  The sections below summarize some of the 
concepts and apply them in broad terms to the case described 
here. 
A. Ex Ante and Ex Post 
There are two principal loci at which usage rights may be 
enforced: ex ante:  before a potentially harmful interference 
event has occurred; and (2) Ex post: after a potentially harmful 
interference event has occurred (though this does not mean 
that actual harm has been realized). Further, ex ante and ex 
post approaches work in tandem, not in isolation.  Thus, a 
choice of an ex ante approach affects the ex post strategies.   
The choice of how to design the enforcement mechanism 
directly and indirectly impacts the design and costs of usage 
rights enforcement.  In particular, the costs of inducing good 
behavior (avoiding bad behavior) must be balanced against the 
social costs and benefits under different scenarios. So, the cost 
of strong ex ante rules is that they need to be enforceable and 
may pose the risk of overly restricting behaviors that may be 
welfare enhancing (e.g., innovation) as well as decreasing the 
value of the sharing opportunity for the entrant (i.e., the LTE 
operator(s)).  
In the case of MetSat and LTE sharing, the question (more 
precisely) is what are the consequences of various ex post 
enforcement mechanisms are and how that affects the ex ante 
rules, which, in turn, potentially affects the value of the 
secondary sharing.  The initially proposed mechanisms are 
very heavy on ex ante controls (e.g., a large exclusion zone) 
with no significant consideration of ex post mechanisms, i.e., 
the detection of events above -10 dB Interference-to-Noise-
Ratio
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  that are clearly attributable to LTE and the 
adjudication of those events [6].   
Ex post penalties serve (1) to promote cooperation between 
primary and secondary user and (2) to compensate for 
violations.  In the case of MetSat, the PU is interested in 
preserving their ability to receive a weak signal, so it is 
difficult to conceive of a scenario in which a SU is harmed.  
Thus, in the analysis below, we assume that a SU can harm the 
PU, but not vice versa. 
B. Precision of Enforcement 
In general, we consider an enforcement approach to be more 
precise if it more specifically differentiates legitimate users 
 
1 Based on ITU-R Recommendation SA1026. 
and uses from illegitimate ones. The cost (including the 
complexity) of this depends on some attributes of the system 
itself. The maximum practical cost of enforcement is closely 
linked to the value of the resource: as the resource becomes 
more valuable, the more worthwhile it may be to invest in 
more precise enforcement technology.   
For commercial LTE services (the SU in this scenario), the 
most precise enforcement mechanism would be able to 
control/identify particular handsets on a moment-by-moment 
basis based on factors such as the phone’s location and the 
primary user’s instantaneous usage.  Ex ante enforcement 
would involve permission to transmit on the shared band and 
ex post enforcement would entail identifying the precise time 
and location of handsets whose signals exceeded the agreed-
upon co-channel interference threshold.  By contrast, the least 
precise enforcement mechanism would involve the creation of 
large exclusion zones as the ex ante  mechanism, and a simple 
co-channel interference threshold detection system, perhaps 
with signal classifiers (to exclude non-LTE interference) but 
without any attempt at locating the interfering handset.   
 More precise approaches include: (1) ex ante approach 
would be to have a dynamic exclusion zone that was based on 
the current PU behavior and to identify the location and 
identity of the interfering radio ex post; or (2) rely exclusively 
on ex post enforcement where the penalties are established 
such that the secondary user privately develops “soft” 
exclusion zones based on interference history that maximize 
their total profit.  
IV. ENFORCEMENT APPROACHES FOR 1695-1710MHZ 
A. Ex Ante approaches 
Ex ante enforcement works by attempting to prevent 
interference.  One such approach is use of exclusion zones.  In 
this approach, the PUs and SUs would agree on a spatial 
database that defines these exclusion zones.  In its initial 
submissions, NTIA proposed exclusion zones with a radius in 




Figure 1 - Proposed Exclusion Zones 
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An “exclusion zone” means that no in-band emissions from 
SUs would be permitted in its interior. Handsets operating in 
the region would have to be handed off to a different uplink 
frequency to continue operating.  Since the PU is a receive-
only earth station, there should be no in band emissions at all 
in the exclusion zone. 
The opportunity cost of these exclusion zones can be high. 
Spectrum prices can vary significantly [8] and different 
valuation approaches can produce different results [9].  
Nonetheless, the exclusion zones in this band have been 
estimated to reduce auction revenue by approximately $1.1 
billion [10]. 
Since the antenna orientation of the MetSat earth station is 
not fixed, the use of fixed exclusion zones represents a worst-
case solution.  In any particular reception episode, the 
exclusion zone is ovate, as shown in Figure 2.  A circular 
exclusion zone is the union of all possible instantaneous 
exclusion zones. 
 
Figure 2 - Instantaneous exclusion zones 
B. Ex post approaches 
Exclusion zones do not provide a guarantee of co-channel 
interference avoidance.  Since propagation is unpredictable, 
uplink signals could occasionally travel farther than expected.  
Furthermore, the exclusion zones do not explicitly account for 
tall features, like tall buildings and mountains that can cause 
longer than expected propagation distances.  As a result, ex 
post mechanisms may be needed to provide data to PUs and 
SUs to further tune the system for future interference 
avoidance.   
By definition, ex post mechanisms are invoked after an 
interference event attributable to the SU occurs.  To be in a 
position to take ex post action, the PU must be able to detect 
very low signal energy (-10 dB INR) at their antenna site and 
determine that it is associated with SU activities.   
To associate interference event with the SU(s) means that 
the PU has either some knowledge about the SU’s signal 
characteristics and/or an identification code that can easily be 
obtained by demodulating part or all of the SU’s signal.  For 
example, in the case of MetSat, the SU will most likely be a 
carrier using LTE, which has a distinct electromagnetic 
signature.  If multiple SUs exist, the LTE signal would have to 
be demodulated to identify the source of the interference.  
Demodulating very low level signals is very difficult, which 
could lead to higher adjudication costs if the source of an 
interfering signal attributed to a specific SU.   
If SU interference is detected, the event is entered into an 
adjudication system, which establishes a procedure by which a 
determination of fault is made.  If the adjudicator finds fault, 
then a remedy is ordered. 
It is often the case that an ex post remedy involves a penalty 
or a fine that serves both to compensate the PU and deter the 
SU.  To ensure cooperation, the SU should find it cheaper to 
avoid interfering with the PU than to pay the penalty.  In 
particular,      , where d is the probability of detection 
and successful adjudication, P is the penalty paid and B is the 
benefit the SU obtains from transmitting in a way that causes 
interference.  The uncertainties of RF propagation mean that 
interference events may be accidental.  If the average payment 
is based on willful interference, the SU will (1) have an 
incentive to optimize their system to eliminate interference 
events and (2) be indifferent to intent (i.e., willful or 
accidental).   
C. Data collection in ex post enforcement 
Ex post mechanisms require the ability to detect co-channel 
interference and potentially adjacent channel signals.  It is 
further helpful if the source of the interference can be 
localized.  Finally, for long term credibility, the detection 
mechanism must be free from incentives to over- or under-
report events.  While a variety of institutional arrangements 
may be possible, it is likely than an independent sensor 
network (similar to what was proposed in [7]) would emerge 
as an SU might distrust a PU-operated sensing system (and 
vice versa) because the PU would have an incentive to 
maximize penalty payments from the SU. 
To help localize the source of the interference, at least two 
sensors near the PU antenna would have to be in a position to 
detect the interfering signal.  Since the orientation of the 
MetSat antenna is variable, the sensors must ring the earth 
station site.  Eight sensors located every 45° on a circle around 
the earth station, each with >90° beam width antennas should 
provide sufficient coverage (assuming their sensitivity can be 
high enough with that beam width).  The sensor network 
would have the responsibility of classifying and reporting 
interference events. 
 
D. Locus of adjudication in ex post enforcement 
The locus of adjudication is a critical question.  The 
adjudicator (1) must be trusted by the PU and SU and (2) have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate interference events.  The parties 
could designate an arbitrator to make a determination of both 
the legitimacy of a supposed interference event and its 
consequence; however it is easy to imagine that some 
interference allegations might be appealed. In the case of the 
1695-1710 MHz band, the civil courts would likely refer the 
matter to the FCC for resolution, but the FCC has no 
jurisdiction over federal frequency bands and the NTIA has no 
mechanism for dealing with civil disputes.  The recent PCAST 
report on spectrum [2] briefly addresses this issue, but more 
work remains to be done; it is not the purpose of this paper to 
resolve this question, simply to point out that it requires clarity 
in resolution.   
V. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
A. Dynamic Exclusion Zones 
While a static exclusion zone is relatively straight-forward 
to enforce, it has high opportunity costs, as noted above.  For 
example, in the Washington DC metro area, it is easy to 
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imagine an exclusion zone that covers Wilmington DE and 
Baltimore MD during a hypothetical reception episode, but not 
Washington DC, Richmond VA or Norfolk VA.   
Since the orbits of the satellites are predictable, the 
exclusion zone becomes spatio-temporal (instead of only 
spatial).  A dynamic exclusion zone could function as 
effectively as the static exclusion zone proposed by NTIA at a 
lower opportunity cost.  To be implemented, the dynamic 
exclusion zone could either be implemented in the database or 
it could be computed in the handset.  The design decision to 
rely on signalling or local computation would be based on a 
joint optimization of handset power and signalling overhead. 
Even with exclusion zones, co-channel interference is 
possible.  If exclusion zones are sized to avoid interference, 
then there may not be a strong basis for ex post action, except 
to determine if the interfering station was located within the 
exclusion zone during the interference episode.  Unless the PU 
builds a sensor network that broadly covers the exclusion 
zone, then it will be difficult to offer concrete evidence of SU 
transmission within the exclusion zone.     
B. Protection Zones 
In its final report, CSMAC proposed to eliminate exclusion 
zones entirely in favor of protection zones [9].  This would 
allow SU operation as long as the aggregate received co-
channel interference at the PU antenna is below a yet to be 
determined threshold
2
.  CSMAC claims that these protection 
zones are smaller than exclusion zones (14 – 95 km vs 72 – 
121 km, depending on the location in question).  For the 
Suitland MD site, the protection zone still encompasses the 
Washington DC metro area.  According to the CSMAC report, 
the protection zones are smaller because they are based on 
more realistic propagation models rather than the worst case 
ones underlying the exclusion zones. 
This approach essentially reorganizes the locus of 
enforcement from ex ante toward ex post, since protected 
zones would definitely require spectrum sensing and an 
adjudication procedure.  Because transmission could be 
permitted in the protection zone, its opportunity cost would 
likely be substantially lower than that of the exclusion zone 
($1.1 billion according to [10]). 
C. Ex Post Only 
Taken further, the parties could rely exclusively on ex post 
enforcement.  In such a scenario, the penalties for interference 
would be set so that the SU would have an incentive to 
discover profit maximizing protected zones.  That is, if the 
cost of interference is sufficiently high, the SU would find it 
advantageous to modify their behavior in a way that balances 
the consequence of interference with the consequence of not 
transmitting in a region.  Such a system would require regular 
calibration of the interference penalties so that the PU’s 
operational SINR can be attained. 
 
2 The CSMAC Working Group 1 Final Report [9] uses a new Interference 
Power Spectral Density (IPSD) measure as the essential threshold. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
Each of the approaches to spectrum sharing outlined above 
has different implications.   
A. Exclusion Zones 
Exclusion zones, whether static or dynamic, would rely 
largely on a database.  This database would be an operational 
mechanism by which each exclusion zone would be defined.  
It is likely that the PU would maintain a reference database 
that would be copied by the SUs and incorporated into their 
operational LTE networks.   
Database costs are challenging to estimate in the absence of 
expected query rates and response time requirements.  In [13], 
the authors examine cloud-based database services. The 
advantage of this costing approach is that operating costs are 
explicitly included.  A DSA-oriented estimate was performed 
as well [14], but it was missing the transaction rate and 
response time requirements as well.  Further, it omitted 
operating costs.  For our purposes, we make a estimate that 
initial capital costs for the database would be $200,000.  The 
complexity of the database for a dynamic exclusion zone 




Ex post enforcement in this approach could be used to (1) 
tune the contours of the exclusion zones to optimize 
operations and/or (2) detect violations of the exclusion zone 
by SUs.  The costs of the objectives are quite different.  In (1), 
a sensor network could be used to localize the strength and 
direction of SU associated interference events. So, the 
feedback from sensor network could be used to optimize the 
size and shape of the exclusion zone.   This would require 
sensing near the PU’s earth stations and implies ongoing 
discussions between the PU and SU(s).  The adaption of the 
exclusion zone would be a relatively slow process and would 
depend on the level of cooperation (and trust) between PUs 
and SUs. Bilateral adaption of the exclusion zone means that 
the PUs would have to risk interference by allowing SU 
operations within the contours of the existing exclusion 
zone(s) and measuring interference.  If none occurs over some 
time period, the exclusion zone can be shrunk.  If interference 
occurs, the SU must agree to immediately cease operations 
and the exclusion zone is maintained.  Similarly, exclusion 
zones would be expanded in locations where interference is 
measured.  If the incentives to PUs and SUs can be made to 
align with the overall system goals, then this can work; if the 
incentives favor local optimization at the expense of system 
goals, then cooperation can be expected to be limited in the 
long term. 
If we do not assume cooperation between SUs and PUs, then 
scenario (2) applies.  In this case, the sensor network would 
have to be more comprehensive since the PU would seek to 
demonstrate SU operation within the exclusion zone.  This 
cannot be done definitively from the PU earth station, so a 
network of sensors would have to be constructed.   
 
3 The database approach to managing spectrum sharing is being used by 
the TV White Space devices.  We do not have space in this paper to discuss 
database designs and architectures for DSA applications. 
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The sensing node cost is dominated by the cost of the towers 
if they are needed.  Backhaul costs can be significant if the 
needed data rate cannot be accommodated with low bit rate 
commercial wireless services.  Without the towers, 
narrowband sensors of the kind needed here would be $500-
$1000 [14].  Since these should not interfere with the PU’s 
reception, towers need not be high; it is possible that sensors 
mounted on the earth station building would be sufficient.  In 
that case external installation with directional antennas would 
add another $2000 in capital costs.  Operating costs would 
consist largely of regular maintenance and backhaul costs. 
In scenario (1), eight sensors may be sufficient to provide 
the information needed to optimize the contour of the 
exclusion zone (through the database) to minimize 
interference events.  Thus, an estimate of capital costs for data 
collection in support of ex post optimization would be 
$24,000.  Operation and maintenance costs would likely meet 
or exceed this figure over the life of the sensor. 
In scenario (2), the costs become higher, as signal detection 
and localization capability for the entire exclusion zone must 
be provided.  The number of sensors would clearly be higher, 
though it may be sufficient to place sensor stations every r km 
around the circumference (where r is the radius of the 
exclusion zone), so 7 additional sensor stations would be 
needed, at an additional cost of $7000 plus tower costs (which 
are much more difficult to assess).  Operating costs would also 
be significantly higher, as on-site maintenance would require 
traveling to all sites.   
B. Protection Zones 
In the case of protection zones, sensing at the PU’s earth 
station is sufficient, as the metric of interest is the IPSD.  The 
sensors must be configured to measure this value and attribute 
it appropriately to the SU(s).  This may require somewhat 
more post processing to estimate low level IPSD values (-10 
dB INR) but may not result in significantly more costly 
sensors.   
The existence of this zone also implies a database that 
defines its boundary.  Thus, this approach would have to use a 
database similar to the exclusion zone approach.  
Operationally, the SUs would have to estimate the signal 
energy they are generating within the protection zone so as not 
to exceed the IPSD threshold.  Feedback from sensors around 
the PU’s earth station would be critical to optimizing this. 
The larger unknown is the cost of ex post enforcement.  The 
CSMAC Final Report [12] does not address adjudication or the 
consequences of exceeding the IPSD threshold.  If an 
adjudication procedure exists, then the interference events 
must be documented and attention paid to issues such as 
provenance and chain-of-custody, which requires back-end 
information system expenses.  It may also require ongoing 
attention of an individual to act as a liaison between the 
adjudicator and/or the secondary user.   
C. Ex Post Only 
The logical extension of the protection zone concept is to not 
define a zone at all, but simply to define an IPSD threshold 
that cannot be exceeded.  Penalties for exceeding this must be 
defined in advance and must be periodically re-calibrated to be 
in balance with the incentives SUs face to exceed the 
threshold.   
 This approach would not require a database, but would 
require the establishment and operation of a sensor network as 
well as the adjudication-oriented information system.  If 
adjudication can be automated, this approach could perhaps be 
made more efficient.   
D. Adjudication Costs 
Both the protection zone and ex post only approach require 
an adjudication mechanism as discussed above. Approaches to 
adjudication can be highly variable, from binding arbitration 
through formal legal proceedings, so the cost structure and 
time to final resolution can be highly variable.   
Regardless of the approach, adjudication requires paying for 
an adjudicator.  Further, information management systems to 
support adjudication are required for the PU, the SU and the 
adjudicator to appropriately deal with evidence and open 
proceedings.  Finally each entity will require ongoing 
professional staffing. 
These costs can be reduced if some or all of the adjudication 
procedures can be automated.  This would be desirable if 
interference events are frequent, but may not meet “due 
process” standards.   
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
DSA seems destined to be a feature of the wireless 
communication landscape for the foreseeable future.  Thus, it 
is critical that we develop an approach to understanding, 
implementing and enforcing a set of rights and obligations that 
make sense for primary as well as (potential) secondary users.  
Spectrum sharing arrangements that do not explicitly define 
obligations and their enforcement are essentially non-binding 
[3] and thus provide no protection for incumbents or the 
secondary users. The emergent nature of DSA systems 
suggests that enforcement approaches should allow for 
learning from direct experience as well as the experiences of 
other DSA systems.   
In this paper, we have examined a particular case of 
spectrum sharing (the 1695-1710 MHz band) and have 
examined the enforcement of the proposed sharing giving 
consideration to the nature of the incumbent and the secondary 
user.  We have considered three approaches that occupy 
different points on the continuum from ex ante to ex post.  
Each of these has different implications on system costs for 
the primary and secondary users as well as different 
opportunity costs.   
The approach that outlines obligations most clearly is the 
“exclusion zone” approach.  This approach is also the most 
costly, since it requires a database and, in the worst case, an 
extensive sensor network and an as-yet poorly defined 
adjudication system.  This approach also has the highest 
opportunity cost and provides the fewest opportunities for 
adaptive learning. 
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The approach proposed by the CSMAC [12] in its final 
report uses “protection zones”.  This approach defines a 
maximum IPSD that can be present at the PU’s earth station, 
and permits some operations in the (smaller) protection zones 
as long as the IPSD is not exceeded.  This also requires the 
development of an ex post adjudication procedure.  This 
approach would also require a database, though it may be 
sufficient to have sensors near the earth station and not 
throughout the protection zone, so it is likely that the costs 
would be lower.  The opportunity cost for this approach would 
clearly be smaller than the exclusion zone approach since the 
protection zones are smaller and some operations within them 
are permitted.  Without a detailed analysis, one could assume 
that the opportunity cost scales linearly with the ratio of the 
populations affected by the two types of zones.  Since some 
operations are permitted inside the protection zone, this 
approach is more amenable to learning and adaption. 
The final approach proposed in this paper would rely 
exclusively on ex post enforcement.  Thus, a database would 
not be needed, and a sensor network surrounding the earth 
station would be sufficient.  A robust and efficient 
adjudication system with predictable outcomes and penalties 
would be important in this approach, however, since it is 
likely that more interference events would occur.  This 
approach would result in a highly flexible and adaptive system 
and one that could yield ex ante rules that are aimed at 
reducing adjudication costs in the future.   
Spectrum sharing will be a feature of many future wireless 
systems.  Thus, developing effective methods to protect the 
rights of incumbents and entrants is important.  Given the 
newness of this approach and the rapid technological change 
in the wireless industry, it is equally important that this 
approach be adaptive.  
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